IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT 1 STATE OF HAWAII 2 3 JASON HESTER, 4 Plaintiff. 5 VS. No. CIV 14-1-304 LEONARD G. HOROWITZ, et al, 6 7 Defendants. 8 9 TRANSCRIPT OF **ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED PROCEEDINGS** 10 11 held in connection with the above-entitled cause 12 before The Honorable Ronald Ibarra, Circuit Court Judge, presiding on the 30th day of October, 2015, 13 in the County of Hawaii, State of Hawaii, 14 transcribed to the best of my ability, by me, Lisa 15 A. Steinmeyer, Certified Shorthand Reporter No. 514, 16 duly certified under and by virtue of the laws of 17 18 the State of Hawaii. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

1	<u>APPEARANCES</u>
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3	FOR THE PLAINTIFF: Mr. Stephen Whittaker
4	FOR THE PLAINTIFF: Mr. Stephen Whittaker Attorney at Law P. O. Box 964 Kailua-Kona, HI 96745 (Appearing via phone)
5	(Appearing via phone)
6	FOR THE DEFENDANTS: Ms. Margaret Wille
7 8	FOR THE DEFENDANTS: Ms. Margaret Wille Attorney at Law 65-1316 Lihipali Road Kamuela, HI 96743
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issues.

MS. WILLE: No. The physical possession is with Sherri Kane and Leonard Horowitz.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Whittaker, you disagree with any of the statement Miss Wille made?

MR. WHITTAKER: Just now, Your Honor, no.

THE COURT: Okay. So let's then move to the defendants' motion for stay or for dismissal prior to entry of final judgment. Miss Wille?

MS. WILLE: There is one preliminary matter I just want to raise, and that's really with -- I don't believe there was ever a ruling on defendants' motion to amend --

THE COURT: That's correct.

MS. WILLE: -- and join --

THE COURT: Both of you raised that, yes.

MS. WILLE: Yeah. So I just -- you know, in theory they would have the time -- a motion to amend at any time prior to an answer. There was never an answer. So I was not the attorney through that, and trying to get clear on -- basically I'm trying to in my mind get this case back on track, you know, what is the right track, and the two issues that I'm bringing up at this time, you know, one is standing. Standing is a jurisdictional issue

that can be raised at any time. And the second is whether we should stay the proceedings rather than going on and having a final judgment, which as I see it, would be in conflict with the 2005 case. In other words, there was a foreclosure. This is a quiet title action based on a non-judicial foreclosure. With -- and really this came about while I was researching to do a motion for reconsideration. As I started reading the cases and the issues on a prior pending action, it became clear to me that really that it's more appropriate to stay the proceedings rather than go and have what would be in effect two conflicting decisions on the issue of foreclosure.

In any foreclosure case there's really, first, the issue of whether to grant the foreclosure or not, and then what happens otherwise, where are you left, whether there's a deficiency judgment or otherwise, but the idea here is that with regard to foreclosure, you can go either way for a judicial foreclosure or a non-judicial foreclosure, and in this case it was for the judicial foreclosure.

So we now have two issues about -- or two cases about a breach of the same mortgage. We have the same parties or those claiming to be in privity

with the signors of the original mortgage, and then we really have the same matter, breach of that, and so you get down to are these interrelated or are those totally independent issues? And reading over the cases, it's not is it exactly the same identical issue but really is it the same matter, and that's, you know, how — the more I studied it, the more I realized what was going on here, and as the cases say, it's not how in this later filed case how it's — what's the title, how it's characterized, what exactly the remedy is. It's really all about, you know, the same matter. Are they really interconnected?

what's left in the first case, the 2005 case, really comes down to what monies, if any, are still owed. When they went in for the non-judicial foreclosure, they went in for the full amount of the mortgage. They didn't exclude the 150,000 that had been paid in principal to intervening Mazie (phonetic) based on the garnishment order. They didn't exclude the 200,000 that was still in issue, and I do just want to point out that when defendants were told they need to make the final payment, at that time it was the amended final judgment, and the amount that was remaining due was the 150,000. They

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did make that payment within a few days of the amended final judgment.

So basically these are tied together. I think it would be appropriate to stay the proceedings and not go on and have it be where we've got two -- on the issue of foreclosure, two conflicting final judgments.

I'm just switching quickly over to in terms of the issue of standing, which, again, can be raised at any time. This is all about a breach of a mortgage. Hester was not on that mortgage. It's Cecil Loren Lee, and here Mr. Hester is seeking to stand in the shoes of Mr. Lee, of the mortgagee, and where that all came about was really based on a motion to substitute the parties, whether Hester would be a proper party, and when that was introduced, it was introduced that it was his nephew and we had a valid assignment of the mortgage. was then shown by the defendants that he's not the In fact, they still question whether nephew. there's any relationship, whether distant or no relationship, and whether that was a valid mortgage, including based on some of the alterations in the document, which I think at one point the court asked the plaintiffs to explain that issue and there was

never any response to the court's question on how that document appeared to be altered.

So I think the one case that goes into this is really the Imelda Marcos case to saying who is a proper party. You know, in that case they even said it's not even if you're an heir. Ordinarily if you haven't been appointed the personal representative, you should not be able to be substituted per Rule 17 as a proper party.

So in this case you have someone who's not --was not a personal representative, was not an heir. The facts that were given to support it, the close kinship relationship was not true. There's been no really establishment. The burden of proof to show standing is on the --

THE COURT: Excuse me. Mr. Whittaker, are you still there?

MR. WHITTAKER: I am, Your Honor.

MS. WILLE: So the burden of proof is on the party claiming to have standing, in this case standing to represent the interests of another party, and so that's what has not been addressed, and it all -- basically Hester appears at the same time. There's also a mortgage with Hester making -- giving Attorney Paul Sulla a security interest in

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the property. So we have all these -- I think that there's a real question as to the standing of Plaintiff Hester to stand in the shoes of the mortgagee, the original mortgagee.

So I raise those issues at this time, and I think it would be preferable to stay the proceedings at this point rather than going on and having the final decision putting the two cases in conflict.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Whittaker?

MR. WHITTAKER: Well, the kind of global view, initially, Your Honor, I would have to say that this is clearly an attempt to make an end run around the gate to put up the bond to obtain a stay. I'd also make the global observation that basically everything that counsel really asks the court to do is that it has been wronged at each and every turn as it ruled in this case.

One of the interesting things in her memorandum is that she cites the court in connection with the default that (unintelligible) her from making most of the arguments which she's made to Your Honor this morning. She cites the court to this Mount of Zion (phonetic) case where counsel really apparently succeeded at the Intermediate Court of Appeals (unintelligible) by the default and

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urges Your Honor that, well, of course, that's going to happen here with respect to the default the onerous court entered as to her now non-client Our Royal Bloodline of David. On any behalf, Your Honor, I strongly urge she should not be heard, but in any event, in that case that she relies upon, which she failed to attach a copy of in violation of Rule 35 of the Hawaii Rules of Public Procedure, nonetheless, that default, the court expressly observed that the State did not argue in the District Court and did not argue on appeal (unintelligible) they would have suffered prejudice if the default was set aside, clearly distinguishing it from this case where, as Your Honor learned in the initial two questions to Counsel Wille, that her clients are in possession and control of the property and have been throughout without posting a bond in the 2005 case and now trying to avoid having to do so here by asking Your Honor to take the extraordinary step of staying this case before the entry of judgment in a transparent attempt to avoid need for a bond here to the considerable prejudice of Plaintiff Hester.

As to these allegations (unintelligible) accrued to Mr. Hester, it's just beyond me that

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counsel really stands before Your Honor and says that Mr. Hester wasn't in court when he was. challenges his lineage without -- you know, asked her again, defaults should preclude her from making most of these arguments, but she presumed in everything she urges on Your Honor that, well, this ruling was wrong and that ruling was wrong and the 2005 case was going to be reversed and, therefore, you ought to just stop it now and wait for that to happen, and that's not what I believe the law says, and the important part about Counsel Wille making the point that these are both foreclosure cases is that is not as though, Your Honor, one foreclosure case bars all foreclosure cases for all time. If that were so, one would (unintelligible) to default the mortgage, cure it and then be immune from subsequent claims from the creditor. This creditor was unpaid, and the 2005 case was on its way. where, I don't know. I wasn't counsel at that point in time, but it was at some point in some appeal, and a default occurred. A notice was given. A proper non-judicial foreclosure was processed. objection was timely made. The title is now in Mr. Hester, who is the grandnephew of Mr. Lee, and it doesn't matter what his relationship was because as

established by the record before the Third Circuit Court, before the relevant orders were entered, title was duly transferred through the Ecclesiastical Corporation to Mr. Jason Hester, the plaintiff in this action.

The claim, Your Honor, that this is not a repetitive vexatious motion is also not so. The only reason it's not repetitive and vexatious is because now it's being brought for the fourth time by the third lawyer. It was brought first by the plaintiff through the parties pro se, Horowitz and Kane; then it was brought by Carroll; then it was brought by Van Leer, and now it's being brought by Counsel wille.

But I suggest, Your Honor, that the facts have never changed. The law has not changed, and the results should not change. There's no basis for granting this motion. It's extraordinary. It's not within the contemplation of Rule 62. It should be denied with costs to the plaintiff for having to answer it.

THE COURT: Okay. Here's what the court is going to do. First, the court -- as both counsel know -- well, counsel were concerned about there has been no judgment entered, and the procedural history

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goes back as far as the counsel attempts to get together to prepare a final judgment that would be sufficient for appeal purposes. In fact, the procedural history that it goes back to July of this year when Miss Wille and Mr. Whittaker tried to get together, to come together with a final judgment that would be acceptable to both for appeal purposes, and I see there's been letters going back and forth, correspondences, until September at least, September of this year, and so that's the first concern.

So given that and there's also, as Miss Wille points out and Mr. Whittaker points out, there's an outstanding order on the -- I think this was Judge Strance's decision -- denying the motion to amend answer and join indispensable parties. So the court will need to also enter that order.

So given the status of -- procedural status of this case, it is the court's intent to proceed this way: The court will enter the order denying motion to amend answer and join indispensable parties, and the court then will enter a judgment because the parties were not able to come together with a judgment. The court will issue its own judgment, and on this motion the court will continue to ten

days after the file date of the judgment to allow 1 the parties to submit any supplemental based on the 2 court's issuance of the judgment without further 3 argument, and so Miss Wille's motion -- so, Miss 4 wille, you will have ten days for the first filing, 5 any supplemental to this motion, and, Mr. Whittaker, 6 I'll give you, likewise, ten days, ten business days 7 thereafter to respond to Miss Wille's supplemental, 8 and without further hearing, the court will decide 9 the defendants' motion for stay or for dismissal 10 prior to entry of final judgment and, of course, 11 this will be after final judgment. 12 13 MS. WILLE: So just to be clear, so you 14 will be --15 THE COURT: Issuing --16 MS. WILLE: The judgment so --17 THE COURT: Well, first of all, issue the 18 order --19 MS. WILLE: The order. 20 -- denying motion to amend THE COURT: 21 answer --22 MS. WILLE: Yes. 23 THE COURT: -- that was heard February of this year before Judge Strance. 24 25 MS. WILLE: Yes.

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THE COURT: Then the court will issue the judgment and file it and, Miss Wille, regarding this motion, it's continued. You have ten days, ten business days after the filed date of the judgment to submit any supplemental brief you wish to support your motion for stay.

> MS. WILLE: Okay.

THE COURT: And then Mr. Whittaker thereafter will have ten days after Miss whittaker -- Miss Wille's file date and -- well, service, of course.

> MS. WILLE: Okay.

THE COURT: So defendants' motion for stay or for dismissal are continued as stated.

MS. WILLE: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Whittaker, any

clarification?

MR. WHITTAKER: The only clarification on the timing of my reply and the filing, Your Honor, you made it clear that it was ten business days for Miss Wille.

THE COURT: After certificate of service.

MR. WHITTAKER: (Unintelligible).

So we'll make it clear. So if THE COURT: Miss Wille says she mailed it to you, you get two

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more days in the mail from that mailing date, plus
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      the ten.
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              MR. WHITTAKER: So that's ten calendar
     days, plus the two mailing days. Got it.
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              THE COURT: If she mails it, yes.
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              MR. WHITTAKER: Yes, Your Honor. Thank
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     you.
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              THE COURT:
                         Okay.
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              MS. WILLE: Thank you, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: That's all.
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                  (Whereupon, the proceedings were
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     concluded.)
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<u>CERTIFICATE</u> STATE OF HAWAII SS. COUNTY OF HAWAII I, Lisa A. Steinmeyer, CSR 514, RPR, CRR, Certified Shorthand Reporter of the Third Circuit Court of Hawaii, do hereby certify that the foregoing 16 pages contain a true and correct transcript of the electronically recorded proceedings, transcribed to the best of my ability, held in connection with the aforementioned cause. WITNESS MY HAND this 5th day of November, 2015. unnecs STEINMEYER, CSR