1 2	IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT STATE OF HAWAII		
3	JASON HESTER, )		
4	Plaintiff, )		
5	vs. No. CIV 14-1-0304		
6	LEONARD G. HOROWITZ, et al, 2		
7	Defendants.		
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9	TRANSCRIPT OF		
10	ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED PROCEEDINGS		
11	held in connection with the above-entitled cause		
12	before The Honorable Melvin Fujino, Circuit Court		
13	Judge, presiding on the 26th day of February, 2016,		
14	in the County of Hawaii, State of Hawaii,		
15	transcribed to the best of my ability, by me, Lisa		
16	A. Steinmeyer, Certified Shorthand Reporter No. 514,		
17	duly certified under and by virtue of the laws of		
18	the State of Hawaii.		
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1	<u> APPEARANCES</u>		
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3	FOR THE PLAINTIFF:	Mr. Stephen Whittaker	
4		Mr. Stephen Whittaker Attorney at Law P. O. Box 964 Kailua-Kona, HI 96745	
5		Railwa Rona, na 30112	
6	FOR THE DEFENDANTS:	Ms. Margaret Wille	
7	FOR THE DELENDANTS.	Attorney at Law 65-1316 Lihipali Road Kamuela, HI 96743	
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# (Whereupon, the following proceedings

THE CLERK: Calling Civil 14-1-304, Jason Hester versus Leonard Horowitz, et al. One, motion for reconsideration or alternatively, for a new trial; two, defendants' motion to stay judgment pending finality of related action, Civil No. 05-1-096, HRCP Rule 62(B); three, defendants' motion for stay HRCP Rule 62(B) pending the disposition of defendants' post judgment motions.

THE COURT: State your appearance.

MR. WHITTAKER: Good morning, Your Honor. Stephen Whittaker appearing on behalf of Jason Hester in opposition to the motions.

MS. WILLE: And Margaret Wille, attorney for defendants, Leonard Horowitz and Sherri Kane.

THE COURT: Good morning. Okay. Let's address the resubmission of defendants' motion to stay pending finality in related action, Civil No. 05-1-196 now on appeal. Procedurally there's a defendants' motion for stay or for dismissal prior to entry of final judgment, HRCP 62(B), that was filed on October 5th, 2015 and heard on October 30th, 2015 before Judge Ibarra; is that correct?

MS. WILLE: Correct.

THE COURT: And in the interim from that 1 time until today, the court's understanding is that 2 since it was not a final judgment filed at the 3 October 30th, 2015 hearing, Judge Ibarra allowed you 4 to continue your motion and to supplement your 5 And is that what you did? motion. 6 MS. WILLE: Yeah, but we did rehear it 7 following the final judgment. 8 THE COURT: And that's your resubmission of 9 defendants' motion to stay pending finality in 10 related action? 11 MS. WILLE: Correct, and he asked us to 12 submit any comments --13 THE COURT: Supplemental. 14 MS. WILLE: -- or information within ten 15 days, ten days after the filing of that final 16 judgment, and plaintiff was to submit any opposition 17 within ten days of my filing, and that did not 18 happen, but --19 THE COURT: Since the October 30th hearing, 20 and in the interim the court entered a final 21 judgment on December 30th, 2015. 22 Correct. MS. WILLE: 23 THE COURT: Right? 24 Correct. 25 MS. WILLE:

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THE COURT: Okay. So --

MR. WHITTAKER: May I, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. WHITTAKER: I was at that hearing, too, and what Judge Ibarra said was that your motion to stay a judgment is premature because the judgment hasn't been entered.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. WHITTAKER: You may file it anew after the judgment is entered, which is what she did. He did not prescribe any ten-day time period for me to respond to her motion as she's urging on Your Honor, and I am not in default in that particular — there's no order to that effect, and I am — it may be that he said that but I sure didn't get it in my notes, Your Honor, and if so, I apologize.

Nonetheless, Your Honor has our opposition, and I believe you've had time to consider it.

MS. WILLE: He explicitly stated he did not write an order. He stated it and directed, and he questioned him concerning whether it was calendar days or whether it was business days, but I think let's get to the heart of the matter.

THE COURT: Well, I guess the question the court has is if Judge Ibarra directed that you were

to file within ten days the supplemental brief and the court's minutes indicate that Mr. Whittaker was supposed to file ten days, business days after, he said ten business days after your supplemental brief and the court clarified ten calendar days, plus two mailing days from certificate of service. So go ahead.

MS. WILLE: Yes. So I did hurry and get that in within those ten days, and there was no response from the plaintiff's attorney.

THE COURT: But it's a continued motion of your motion for stay or for dismissal that was filed on October 5th, 2015. Anything further that you have to add to your motion, on that motion?

MS. WILLE: Okay. On that motion, you know, first I just want to tie -- give a comment, you know. This has been a really incredible, I consider, scam starting with the original sale of the property to defendants, despite an outstanding lien on the property for over \$200,000, and that was just the beginning.

THE COURT: Can I just stop you for a moment? Just -- the court's understanding is this case, this Civil 14-1-0304, deals only with the quiet title action. The other case on appeal deals

with the foreclosure.

MS. WILLE: Yes, but the question here is whether it's appropriate to stay this proceeding pending the conclusion of that case, and as -- you know, the court in Blake versus County of Kauai said where the proceedings in the current litigation are intertwined with the outcome of the prior case, that a stay is appropriate. In this case they are intertwined.

The 2005 judicial foreclosure case was based on the same property, the same mortgage, the same series of transactions, and the outcome was that foreclosure was denied and, in fact, the original — the final judgment and the amended final judgment were for additional an \$200,000 in damages, which would be deducted from — which would be deducted from the amount of the mortgage outstanding, which was 350,000. At that time the court said pay up the difference, which was 150,000, and then — that was like — my clients considered this is done.

Then months later, following numerous other filings arguing the same point, there was a 60(B) motion to -- for -- to reverse on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, to reverse the vacation -- to vacate the damages. So it all ties

together. So that's the question outstanding there is, did they pay it in full or did they not?

At the time the motion for judgment -- the 60(B) motion under -- following the motion for judgment as a matter of law came about, it was whether the complaint or the counterclaims filed back in 2005 were submitted with sufficient particularity. That's a Rule 50 motion, and the prerequisite for that motion is to have made the motion prior to the case going to the jury. That was never done.

My point is that these two cases are intertwined. I mean, it would be very wrong at this point to just say, no, these are completely separate. This is just a quiet title. This is a different guy. He doesn't have to take on any of the baggage of what happened before of his predecessor interest; he just has to -- is able to pursue whatever rights without taking on any of the liabilities of the case.

My clients -- I mean, it's just obviously been a nightmare for them. All of a sudden, the case is done and up pops this repeated motion that had been denied in the past to reconsider the case based on failure to -- the insufficient particularity in the

complaint, and then it's suddenly whatever that's filed four or five months later, and the court grants it a few months later. So they are intertwined because the key is, did they pay in full? They paid in full at the time the court said pay up and it was a done deal for them. They thought it was all over. So now we have this, you know, post judgment motion, which isn't a permitted post judgment motion unless you did a motion prior to the case going to the jury coming up.

So we're now -- there's two ways to do a foreclosure. One is a judicial foreclosure; one is a non-judicial foreclosure.

THE COURT: Okay, but --

MS. WILLE: Basically they weren't getting their way in the non-judicial so they switched -- in the judicial so they switched over and prior to conclusion of this case began --

THE COURT: When you say this case, you mean the one before the court today or the one you're talking about, the foreclosure?

MS. WILLE: Yeah. The judicial foreclosure is the '05 case. The quiet title case here is to enforce a non-judicial foreclosure that was commenced after -- while the other was still

pending, and with a different -- up pops Jason
Hester as a successor to plaintiff (indecipherable),
but the key here is what is conclusion of the case?
I know that plaintiff says this has been going on
too long. It has been going on too long. My client
says the same thing. It's been going on ten years,
and I think now he's arguing it's moot because the
case has been knocked back to the Circuit Court
because it isn't a -- it didn't comply with Jenkins
and Rule 58, but we have submitted, resubmitted the
final judgment, consistent with what the court
directed, the Intermediate Court of Appeals
directed.

THE COURT: That's in the foreclosure case.

MS. WILLE: Yeah. So I'm just saying they're tied together. The foreclosure case has not terminated, and I think it would be very wrong to say, okay, this is just a separate deal, they're not tied together, when really they're proceeding based on an outcome that wasn't concluded in that case.

MR. WHITTAKER: Your Honor, on the motion to stay, first of all, counsel is asking Your Honor to find that she and her client are going to prevail on an appeal, and there's no basis for that. She's asking you to look beyond the status of this case

that is before Your Honor and to imagine that her clients are correct in every premise they advance in the case that they lost that is now on appeal.

In addition, she is asking you to, I believe, reconsider a host of decisions already made in this and the case that was on appeal before the dismissal by the ICA, and she's asking you to overturn a brother judge of the same rank, and I don't think, Judge, that that's your place with all due respect.

Now, I agree with the premise that the motion that was filed in October was not ruled upon, and so this is a fresh motion for Your Honor, but there is not one single fact in support of the motion for stay that hasn't been said a half a dozen times to Judge Ibarra, either in connection with their opposition for the motion for summary judgment or in connection with their opposition to the motion to dismiss the counterclaims or in connection with one of their host of other motions for reconsideration.

So in its bare bones, this is an end run around the statute that requires if you want to stay a judgment, you post a bond, and she hopes to persuade Your Honor that there is so much merit in the appeal, that you'll ignore the law that requires if you want to stay a judgment, you post a bond.

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Well, I don't believe, Judge, that they have shown you anything that would result or ought to result in such a conclusion.

The arguments she also advances are all arguments that belong only to the defaulted Royal Bloodline of David, and she continues, counsel does, despite her education and her licensure, to urge on the court that it's fine to disregard the default as though it didn't exist. Were that so, Your Honor, there would be no reason for a rule for default. The law says once you're defaulted, you don't get to argue, you don't get to make positions known to the It may well be that as she posits to Your court. Honor she is entitled to file an appeal at the end of the case and include in it the determination of default and the denial of the motion to set aside the default, but in the interim she's got nothing. She's got nothing. She has no standing before Your Honor. The persons, Mr. Horowitz and Miss Kane, have no standing. Royal Bloodline of David has been defaulted. There's no one before Your Honor to ask for a stay.

This stuff about Mr. Hester having no standing, too, is just that, stuff that's been heard by Judge Ibarra, declined by Judge Ibarra. There's

no basis for saying he has no standing. Pursuant to the non-judicial foreclosure, he is the title holder. He had standing to file his quiet title case. He is the owner of record, and he's entitled to a denial on the motion to stay.

with respect to the point I made at the outset, Your Honor, with all due respect, a trial court's discretion to reconsider another judge's prior ruling is necessarily narrow and usually only appropriate when the prior judge is unavailable. This is California authority. I didn't in the interim between receiving notice that we would be appearing before Your Honor and this morning's appearance have time to find specific Hawaii authority on the point, but I think it requires a particular scrutiny for Your Honor to overturn a brother jurist on these self, same facts, and there isn't a new fact before Your Honor today.

MS. WILLE: Judge Ibarra made it clear he was considering the motion for a stay and asked that we -- he would address it following the final judgment. He did not make a ruling on it. He specifically did not dismiss that. So -- and I think in terms of the issues, what we're saying is not that it was not a done deal on the 200,000.

1 That's still pending. It's whether there are
2 serious questions remain. The reason I bring up
3 those legal arguments is to show the judge that

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4 | there are serious questions pending.

with regard to the standing issue, that the Royal Blood of David's property or -- or their -was quit claimed, whatever interest they had, prior to dissolution of that corporation to these defendants. That's number one. Number two, as far as the default against the Royal Blood of David, that -- that default was flawed as far as I'm It was based on -- based on issues, and concerned. I can run through the criteria there, but basically this case seems to have come to a halt with that default, but it's our -- my client or Royal Blood of David have the right to not only appeal but also to ask under Rule 59 and 60 for reconsideration. We're following the proper procedure, and this is a point. It's not -- Judge Ibarra was taking that division's cases temporarily. He did not rule on this, that a motion for reconsideration is appropriate, and he said that the motion for a stay was appropriate and he would consider it at this time.

You know, all of this California law says that you shouldn't rule against your counter judge is

really out of line.

whether these two cases are tied together and whether there should be a stay, and if -- basically if you rule on this case in this way, the two cases are in conflict despite it being concurrent. You're going to be executing a judgment before conclusion of the matter where the court already ruled. Judge Ibarra ruled that foreclosure was denied based on the facts and in defendants' favor. So -- and it was only -- that -- the issue of foreclosure isn't being appealed. My client won that. It's just whether there was any deficiency left in what was owed to be paid and, again, they did pay it up based on when the court said pay it up, but then up popped the motion for judgment as a matter of law.

So I think it would be very unfair to just treat this as separate when the whole question that's involved would be related to the outcome in the 196, the 2005 case.

MR. WHITTAKER: Your Honor, if I may, it appears to be counsel's position that there can only be one default and one result under an ownership regime with respect to a piece of property and that because they managed to prevail on the initial

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judicial foreclosure, which argued that they had failed to get permission to make some improvements and/or otherwise comply with some terms of the underlying mortgage, that, therefore, everything is fine and copacetic, notwithstanding the fact that there were monies yet owed on mortgage.

They went on about their way, and they appealed that case, 196, where I was not counsel of record, and I'm hard pressed to respond to all of the claims about what's going on in that case but, nonetheless, that had to do with a default that, indeed, as counsel urges on Your Honor, Judge Ibarra or the jury, I guess, found did not constitute a default warranting foreclosure. There was, however, an outstanding unpaid amount on the mortgage, which was the subject of a judicial foreclosure, which has not been challenged and which is the basis on which my client has title and has prosecuted the quiet title action to the point where judgment has entered in his favor, and now we have this end run asking you to avoid the million dollar bond that would be required were they to try and keep this property away from my client for another ten years and, Judge, there's nothing, nothing in the record that has not been looked at and rejected by Judge Ibarra

in Civil No. 0304.

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THE COURT: Okay. Court is ready to rule. Court has reviewed the files and records in this case, heard the arguments of counsel.

As to defendants' motion for stay or for dismissal prior to entry of final judgment, HRCP 62(B), that was filed on October 5th, 2015 and together with the resubmission of defendants' motion to stay pending finality in related action, Civil No. 05-1-196 that's now on appeal, court will find as to defendants' representation that they represent the Royal Bloodline of David, even under a Rule 59, the time period to -- 59(E), the time -- ten days has already expired. Looking at Rule 60, court will find that under the factors of Rule 60 Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure, the court will still find that there is no new evidence or deny the request for reconsideration of a Rule 60 default as to Royal Bloodline of David. Accordingly, the default judgment stands.

As to the motion itself, while the defendants cites to Rule 59(A) as grounds, that's for a new trial. In Civil No. 14-1-0304, there was not a trial in that case. So there cannot be grounds for a new trial, even considering that defendant meant

59(E). As to the final judgment under Rule 58 filed on December 30th, 2015, that request is timely under 59(E). However, the court will find that under the grounds of 59(E), subsection -- as well as 59(A) for the grounds, the court will deny the request and find that there's no new evidence or evidence that

could have been presented as a reconsideration.

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It appears in this case that in 14-1-0304, there was a motion for summary judgment, which was granted in part, that was filed on August 28th, Thereafter, at a hearing on October 30, 2015, the court -- that court believed that the defendants' motion was premature, as there was no final judgment and that the court had requested the parties to submit the judgment within ten days of that hearing, which was not complied with. Thereafter, the court prepared its own final judgment and filed it on December 30th, 2015 as such, and also the court will find that this Civil No. 14-1-0304 deals with quiet title and the merits have already been adjudicated. There is a 58 judgment in this case. The question then becomes whether or not the court can have jurisdiction to entertain the request now before the court today.

The court will find that the Rule 58 is a

final judgment in this case. The court would deny the motion to stay pending finality in action, Civil No. 15 -- 05-1-196, as well as deny the defendants' motion for stay or for dismissal prior to entry of final judgment filed on October 5th, 2015.

As to defendants' continued motion for stay or for dismissal prior to entry of final judgment, court has heard the motions today. That issue is moot.

As to defendants' motion for stay, Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure 62(B), pending disposition of defendants' post judgment motions, that will be denied as well.

Mr. Whittaker, you prepare the orders.

MR. WHITTAKER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything further from counsel?

MS. WILLE: Yes. Will you at least stay this while we prepare an appeal and address that?

THE COURT: No. That's been denied.

MS. WILLE: That's been denied?

THE COURT: Yeah.

(Whereupon, the proceedings were

23 | concluded.)

#### CERTIFICATE STATE OF HAWAII SS. COUNTY OF HAWAII I, Lisa A. Steinmeyer, CSR 514, RPR, CRR, Certified Shorthand Reporter of the Third Circuit Court of Hawaii, do hereby certify that the foregoing 19 pages contain a true and correct transcript of the electronically recorded proceedings, transcribed to the best of my ability, held in connection with the aforementioned cause. WITNESS MY HAND this 9th day of March, 2016.